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 A hierarchical metropolitan quantum cryptography network upon the inner-city commercial telecom 
fiber cables is reported in this paper. The seven-user network contains a four-node backbone net with 
one node acting as the subnet gateway, a two-user subnet and a single-fiber access link, which is re-
alized by the Faraday-Michelson Interferometer set-ups. The techniques of the quantum router, optical 
switch and trusted relay are assembled here to guarantee the feasibility and expandability of the 
quantum cryptography network. Five nodes of the network are located in the government departments 
and the secure keys generated by the quantum key distribution network are utilized to encrypt the in-
stant video, sound, text messages and confidential files transmitting between these bureaus. The 
whole implementation including the hierarchical quantum cryptographic communication network links 
and the corresponding application software shows a big step toward the practical user-oriented net-
work with a high security level. 
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In the latest two decades, quantum cryptographic service 
has gradually been refined due to the rapid improvement 
of quantum key distribution (QKD) technique in prac-
tice [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Derived from the fundamental laws of 
physics, it can offer a highly secure communication be-
tween legal users, no matter how the eavesdropper tam-
pers with the system in the open channel [6, 7]. However, 
traditional point-to-point QKD protocols have their in-
trinsic limitations on the secure distance and expansi-
bility of users. Quantum secret sharing with GHZ states 
or W states can give a scheme of the communication for 
more than two users [8, 9, 10, 11], nevertheless it is more 
meaningful in quantum communication instead of prac-
tical quantum cryptography. For the fast inflation of user 
number and unforeseen emergent demands of commu-
nication service, so far it seems that a robust quantum 
cryptography network compatible with the classical op-
tical network is a potential solution. 
Since the first quantum cryptography idea for passive 
optical network (PON) is proposed by Townsend et al. 
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 with beam splitters [12, 13], many new topologies for 
quantum network have been designed and subsequently 
quantum network construction has been demonstrated in 
real-built telecom optical network. The first network 
experiment fielded by BBN with 3 nodes in Boston is 
based on the active optical switches [14]. Following that, 
we built a 4-port "star type" quantum network in Beijing 
benefited from a "quantum router" structure which can 
realize the passive routing with WDM apparatus [15]. 
SECOQC also constructs the network with 7 QKD links 
to connect 5 nodes in Vienna [16]. Recently, Chen et al. 
applied the decoy state method to connect 3 nodes to-
gether by treating the node in the middle as a trusted 
relay [17]. 
Here we give a report about our brand-new hierarchi-
cal quantum cryptographic network with decoy state 
method located in Wuhu, China, operated continuously 
beneath the streets of the city. With the improved net-
working techniques of the quantum router, optical 
switch and trusted relay, 7 subsidiaries of the city are 
connected to form a secure communication network.  
 
Figure 1 Structure of the hierarchical quantum cryptographic 
network, which contains techniques of quantum router, trust relay 
and switch router. A to G stand for seven different terminal nodes, 
which link to the backbone in the red dash square or the subnet in 
the blue dash circle individually. The straight line in the figure 
means an optical link with multi-fiber, while the dot dash line 
means the optical link with a single fiber. 
The diagram in Figure 1 gives a detailed exhibition 
about the quantum network. In this network, we con-
struct different levels after considering the priority of 
the bureaus. For four important nodes, a high-level full 
mesh backbone network is built among them and each 
of them can also operate as a trust relay to expand the 
net. Two of the others belong to a subnet, link with an 
optical switch matrix to one trust relay node shown as 
Node "D" in the diagram of the backbone network. In 
addition, we use one single telecom fiber to add the 
seventh node into the network, for both the classic net-
work connection and QKD distribution, to infer the po-
tential of our QKD network even if the fiber channel is 
limited. 
Compared with the prior network projects, this QKD 
network implements hierarchical structure with 
multi-levels for the first time and contains three differ-
ent existing PON techniques. For nodes with different 
priorities and demands, we set them in the central back-
bone network or the subnet, and choose suitable PON 
technique. All the QKD links are based on the BB84 
protocol with decoy state method which can promise the 
security level for the communication. Meanwhile, QKD 
software that all nodes run and application programs for 
encrypting text messages, sound and video are devel-
oped as well. So this quantum cryptographic network is 
not just a prototype but a practical user-oriented one. 
 
1.  Technical introduction 
1.1  Basic QKD-link device 
Each path has one QKD link with a set of devices be-
tween two terminals. Here, we use the Fara-
day-Michelson Interferometer (FMI) set-up to imple-
ment the phase coding QKD [3]. Jeopardized by the po-
larization dependent loss (PDL) and polarization mode 
dispersion (PMD) of the single mode communication 
fibre, most of the QKD implementations have to use a 
polarization controller (PC) to stabilize the polarization 
and decrease its influence in laboratory experiments. 
Nevertheless in a real station node, it is not convenient 
to plug such a device into the well-compacted system 
box. Significantly, FMI QKD set-up can take advantage 
of the Faraday mirrors to constrain the influence of the 
polarization in the way [7, 18]. A Faraday mirror’s Jones 
matrix can be given as  
0 1
1 0
FM
                   (1) 
Subsequently the transmitting Jones matrix in the chanel 
Tall can be expressed as  
Tall=T-1·FM·T=eiφFM            (2) 
Here T stands for the unidirectional transmittance that is 
modeled as consisting of a discrete number of birefri-
gent elements. The analysis shows that the output po-
larization is always orthogonal to the input one regard-
less of any birefringence in the fiber, and guarantees that 
2 Fangxing Xu et al. Chinese Science Bulletin | July 2009 | vol. 54 | no. ? | ?-? 
A
R
TI
C
LE
S 
  
  
  
  
 
 
the FMI QKD setup can auto-compensate the polarizing 
influence from the channel fluctuation, which has been 
already proved performing well in the metro telecom 
fibers combining the active phase compensation tech-
nique [3, 15, 19]. 
 
Figure 2 Scheme of the original FMI system. Quantum signal 
pulses and synchronization pulses are generated by the laser and a 
1: 99 beam splitter (1/99 BS), which occupy one fibre each. Add-
ing to two fibres for optical transceivers links, four fibres are 
required in total shown with red lines. The dash dot lines stand for 
the electrical signals. 
The communication resource needs to be well con-
cerned as well. In the traditional optical network, with 
the concern of cost, only the important nodes with re-
quirements of high key generation rate and low conges-
tion are distributed enough fibers and channels. A 
none-essential station maybe has only one or two fibers 
to connect with the backbone network. Consequently, 
we have demonstrated two different schemes for these 
two kinds of nodes respectively. Scheme one shown in 
Figure 2 is the original FMI system, that quantum signal 
pulses and synchronizing pulses transmit in two inde-
pendent fibers with the same wavelength. Additionally, 
we use the commercial bi-channel optical transceivers to 
build the classic communication link. By sending the 
1550nm strong pulse to the receiver, one couple of them 
can well communicate with each other after tolerating 
30dB channel loss (150 km in the standard communica-
tion fibres). Typically this scheme needs four independ-
ent fibres. The advantage is that without the crosstalk 
from other pulse sequence, the QKD process can give a 
nice performance with lower quantum bit error rate 
(QBER) and subsequently higher key generation rate. 
This scheme is suitable to distribute quantum secure key 
between important nodes with sufficient communication 
fibers and other resource. 
For those low-level access nodes, we use the modified 
scheme shown in Figure 3. Compared with scheme one, 
four different pulses sequences (classical transmit pulses, 
classical receiving pulses, quantum signal pulses and 
synchronizing pulses) are multiplexed into one fibre, by 
using a circulator and a wavelength division multiplex-
ing (WDM) element. It will significantly save the com-
munication resource of the optical network. However, 
the influence of the Raman scattering and direct 
crosstalk will evidently increase the QBER and restrict 
the communication ability [20], which can be observed in 
the field-test data below. 
 
Figure 3 Scheme of the modified FMI system. Quantum signal 
pulses and synchronization pulses are generated by lasers with 
distinguishable wavelengths. Each of the users multiplexes and 
demultiplexes the pulse sequences with a WDM element and 
transmits the photons in one single fiber between each other. 
 
1.2  Building a backbone network 
Backbone network as the main infrastructure in the 
whole network should have enough ability to tie the 
subnets together. So the network capacity and conges-
tion are taken into consideration with high priority, in-
stead of the high data throughput rate. 
 
 
Figure 4 Structure of a four-port quantum router (QR). User A 
uses photons of different wavelength λ1, λ2 and λ3 to link with 
users B, C and D. The router can automatically transmit the pho-
tons to different outputs for corresponding users. Other users 
follow the same manipulations to build the QKD links. 
Quantum router (QR) with WDM elements in Figure 
4 can supply a direct passive routing, which means that 
each user can distribute the quantum keys with any oth-
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 ers without any manual control. For different individuals, 
one can use photon pulses with specific wavelength to 
communicate. That is, in a N-port network with QR in 
the centre, N(N-1) channels can be established at the 
same time [21]. Meanwhile, because of the high extinc-
tion loss of WDM elements, we can ignore the crosstalk 
from other channels and actualize all the links simulta-
neously [15]. The significance of this quantum router 
structure is that it not only inserts small loss in the 
channel but also can avoid the receive-resend process 
that is easy to cause the information delay in the net-
work with the classical trusted relay, which is quite 
suitable to construct a backbone network with the de-
mand of multiple communication links simultaneously. 
So far, with the off-the-shelf devices a practical quantum 
cryptography network containing more than 100 key 
users can be built, and more users can be added into the 
subnets flexibly. 
 
1.3  Building a subnet 
Subnet is an important concept in the construction of a 
practical network, which comes from the TCP/IP proto-
col. Hierarchically arranged, subnets can separate the 
whole network into smaller efficient parts to prevent the 
information collision in the backbone part. In a subnet, 
we can compromise on the delay of data transmittance 
to achieve high transmittance efficiency and cost effi-
ciency.  
The subnet part of our quantum cryptographic net-
work in Figure 1 is a typical one served with an optical 
switch router and a trusted relay. The server in Node D 
is the border between the backbone net and the subnet 
and controls the traffic as a trusted relay, while the 
switch router is controlled by the computer to establish 
the connection for D and E or for D and F, both in the 
quantum signal channel and the synchronization channel. 
The scheme of network with optical switch is shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Scheme diagram of a three-user subnet built with an 
optical switch. The channels for quantum signals and synchroni-
zation pulses are switched simultaneously by the optical switch 
for the QKD link between different users. A classical local area 
network is built in advance with optical transceivers to link all the 
users in the subnet. 
Optical switch router gives a simple and 
easy-to-implement solution to the expandability of the 
network [14, 22]. However, as long as a shared channel can 
only be used for one QKD connection in such a network 
structure, we have to keep a close watch on the informa-
tion congestion and network complexity. That infers that 
the high-efficiency channel control and key manage-
ment will become important when lots of optical 
switches are used in one net [23]. 
Trusted relay technique is widely used to extend the 
communication distance [24, 25]. The principle is that all 
information travelled between the subnet and the back-
bone net is totally known by the trusted relay. Once the 
security of these trusted relays is guaranteed, the QKD 
network is secured. Meanwhile, for a coherent state 
QKD and decoy state method, trusted relay is quite 
compatible with the scheme. So far trusted relay has 
been a suitable technique in a large-scale quantum 
cryptography network. 
 
1.4  Network protocols 
When we talk about a quantum cryptographic network, 
it actually contains two parts in principle. One is the 
pure optics-connected network to transmit photons and 
distribute quantum keys. The other is the local area 
network (LAN) for the classical communication which 
is necessary for QKD process. This classical network is 
compatible with an Ethernet or Internet as long as the 
communication module follows the standard TCP/IP 
protocols. In this Wuhu quantum network, considering 
that there is no Ethernet access point in the telecom sta-
tions, we use transceivers to build our own LAN, with 
the schemes sketched above in section 1.1.  
As for the QKD process, BB84 phase coding protocol 
with weak+vacuum decoy state method is implemented 
for all the links of the network. In the decoy states 
method, the decoy pulses are designed to sneak into the 
signal photons randomly. Because it is postulated that 
Eve cannot distinguish the signal and decoy pulses, the 
loss and the error rate of signal states can be estimated 
by the measurement result of the decoy states [26, 27, 28, 29]. 
Following ref. [30] (also known as GLLP), the final key 
generation rate is calculated as 
, ,0 , ,0
2 1 2 1{ ( ) ( ) [1 ( )
L UR q Q f E H E Q H e       ]}  
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(3)
where q is the efficiency of the FMI scheme, f(e)=1.2 i
 
s 
x)= the bidirectional error correction efficiency and H2(
-xLog2x-(1-x)Log2(1-x) is the binary entropy function. 
Qμ, Eμ are the gain and error rate of signal states with 
average photon number μ, while Q1, e1 are the gain and 
error rate of single photon states which can be estimated 
as follows [31], 
2 2 2 2
, ,0
1 1
L eQ Q

        2 2 2 vacQ e Q e Q         
 
(4) 
, ,0
1 1 , ,0
1
U
L
E Q e E Q eee e
Q
     


 
       (5) 
When the statistics fluctuation of the measurement is 
considered, Qν, Qvac should be replaced by their upper or 
lower bounds correspondingly shown as follows, 
10(1 )Lx x
x xN Q
   (6) Q Q          
10(1 )Ux x
x x
Q Q
N Q
             (7) 
where x=μ, ν, vac, stands for signal sta
tographic network is built on 
te, decoy state or 
vacuum state, and Nx is the pulse number respectively. 
In our test, because the data size Nx is large enough to 
make the difference between the bounds QxL and QxU as 
small as 0(10-2)Qx, we can ignore the fluctuation and use 
the gain in the calculation directly. Meanwhile, even 
though the extinction ratio of the intensity modulator 
that we used to switch the pulses among such three dif-
ferent states is 25dB at the most, the so-called vacuum 
state is not a real vacuum state. So it is more appropriate 
to estimate the upper bound of e1 tightly with Qν and Eν 
in inequality (5) instead of Qνac. 
With the measurement result achieved in the metro 
quantum network, we can use the above equations to 
estimate the key generation rate for the post-processing 
including CASCADE error correction and privacy am-
plification with a 2-universal hash function, and distrib-
ute a stream of secure keys between terminals which can 
be utilized in practical applications for legal users. 
 
2.  Field operation test 
The whole quantum cryp
the inner-city telecom fiber cables with the distribution 
in the satellite map of Figure 6. In such a field instead of 
laboratory environment, the emergent influences of the 
external vibration and the disturbance from classical 
optical communications have given a crucial test of the 
robustness and stability of this QKD network. Never-
theless, our test data clearly shows that the implementa-
tion of this quantum cryptographic network is good 
enough for practical utilization. 
 
Figure 6 Distribution map of the nodes in the quantum network in 
Wuhu, Anhui. Node A locates in Bureau of Science and Technol-
devices for 
Q
l nine links calculated from the full record 
ogy. B stands for the building of Economic Committee. C is in the 
office of General Labour Union. R stands for the quantum router, 
which locates in the same telecom station with Node D. The 
backbone network is composed of these four nodes. E and F be-
long to the subnet, and are settled in the Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision and the Civic Commerce Stimulus Bureau 
respectively. G, in the telecom station as well, is used to show the 
network compatible with a single-fiber connection. 
We have operated the whole implementation con-
tinuously to check its performance. All the 
KD run with the system frequency of 5 MHz. Single 
photon detectors, including id200 SPD (idQuantic) and 
homemade SPD, have similar quantum efficiency of 
10% and dark counts of nearly 10-6. The visibility is 
98.67% on average. According to the intrinsic error of 
the FMI set-up and a single photon detector, the average 
photon number of signal state and decoy state are uni-
fied as μ=0.6 and ν=0.2 for all links [31], and the ratio 
among signal state, decoy state and vacuum state is set 
as 6: 3: 1. The QKD process distributed the sifted key 
with errors, and subsequently we can distill the final key 
with a Cascade error correction algorithm and a hash 
privacy amplification using parameters from the decoy 
state method. 
Table 1 shows the parameters and final key genera-
tion rate for al
 
 Route A-R-B A-R-C A-R-D B-R-C B-R-D C-R-D D-S-E D-S-F D-G
Wavel nm) ength ( 1550 1530 1510 1510 1530 1550 1530 1530 1510
Distance (km) 5.0 5.6 3.5 3.6 1.5 2.1 10.0 5.0 0.5
Attenuation (dB) 6.28 7.18 4.42 5.13 2.39 4.37 6.23 6.14 1.0
Sifted Key (Kbps) 3.38 2.56 5.32 4.36 8.25 5.42 3.15 3.27 11.0
QBER 2  1 1 2 1 2  1.19% .87% .96% .15% .93% 1.8% .34% .89% 3.8%
Final Key (Kbps) 0.74 0.61 1.73 0.82 2.53 1.58 0.49 0.66 0.08
Tabl e k erat  of ire aths qua etw e row of route stands for the 
pathw
of the experimental data in Table 2 in Appendix. Both of the fiber length and the insertion loss are measured. Node D 
, the key generation rate is insufficient for the one-time pad cryptography 
uti
.  Conclusion 
emonstrated the first hierarchical metropolitan quantum cryptography network with seven nodes on 
e 1, Parameters and th ey gen ion rate  the ent route p  in the ntum n ork. Th
ay of one link, in which A to G stand for seven terminal nodes, R is the quantum router and S is the optical switch router. The row 
of Distance is the actual length of the fiber cables which is not proportional to the practical channel attenuation due to the connection loss 
and other factors. 
 
and E depart farthest of 10 kilometres, but the link between Node A and C gives the largest loss of 7.18 dB, which also 
indicates that in a practical fiber network the connection loss is also the main source of the channel loss, except the 
transmittance loss of the fiber cable with the coefficient as 0.2dB/km. Node A to F is distributed with quantum router 
or optical switch, using the original FMI set-up with four fibers, and the QBER for signal states is 1.8% ~ 2.4% stead-
ily in a metro scale of 10 km. Both the sifted key generation rate and the final key rate are shown as well. Corre-
sponding to different insertion losses, the final key rate changes from 2.5 Kbps to 0.5 Kbps. The last route from Node 
D to G is linked by a single fiber of 500 meters with the insertion loss of 1 dB. The QBER has obviously increased to 
3.8% because of the crosstalk and Raman scattering in the channel, which causes the final key rate of only 83 bps 
even though the sifted key is as large as 11.0 Kbps. The result indicates that for a QKD process, both the sifted rate 
key and QBER are important for the final key gain. The sifted key rate depends on the efficiency and speed of the 
scheme and the routing technique in a network, while the performance of SPD and the balance of the setup affect the 
QBER. For a higher key generation rate in the future, we will focus on improving the speed of the whole system and 
refining the SPD with better behaviour. 
With the current quantum network system
lities, especially when encrypting a video and sound stream with massive data. Consequently we use the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, a classical symmetrical cryptography algorithm to encrypt the plaintext with 
the fast refreshed key sequence of 128 bits supplied by the QKD process. Based on that, a practical netmeeting is 
demonstrated for the Bureaus connected in this network. The sound and video stream signals are transmitted after 
AES encryption to specific subsidiaries through the classical LAN for the instant conference. Secure transmissions for 
text messages and confidential files can also be actualized with well-developed software that is easy to operate for 
users. 
 
3
In May 2009, we d
the inner-city commercial telecom fibers, realized by two different kinds of FMI set-ups, operated continuously be-
neath the streets of Wuhu downtown of China. For a high running efficiency, the whole network is divided into two 
parts with different priorities, a full-mesh backbone net with a quantum router in the center and a subnet based on the 
technique of the optical switch and the trusted relay, which can well guarantee the feasibility and expandability of the 
quantum network. Meanwhile, we utilize the secure key distributed by the quantum network in a practical video con-
ference for all the nodes including the transmittance for instant video, sound, text messages and confidential files. The 
whole implementation with hierarchical QKD network links and well-developed application software clearly shows a 
big step toward the practical user-oriented quantum network.  
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A
 
T
pulse number, gain and QBER for X state, where X=μ, ν, vac stands for the signal state, decoy state and vacuum state respectively. All the 
data is achieved during a continuous running period of 20 minutes. 
Route A-R-B A-R-C A-R-D B-R-C 
Nμ 1  1  1 1  1 1  1  1  1.20×109.25×109 .40×109 .08×109 .23×109 .11×109 .23×109 .18×109 .08×109
Qμ 0.0069169 0.0052029 0.0108466 0.0085879 0.0167524 0.0106854 0.0063737 0.0065981 0.022125
Eμ 0.0219 0.0187 0.0196 0.0215 0.0193 0.0180 0.0235 0.0189 0.0380 
Nν 6 7  5 6  5  6  5  5  6.27×108 .00×108 .40×108 .14×108 .53×108 .14×108 .90×108 .41×108 .02×108
Qν 0.0024508 0.0018022 0.0040541 0.0029451 0.0061579 0.0038264 0.0021723 0.0022359 0.007593
Eν 0.0307 0.0312 0.0331 0.0309 0.0326 0.0330 0.0306 0.0278 0.0425 
N 2 2  1 2  1  2  2  1  2vac .09×108 .33×108 .80×108 .05×108 .84×108 .05×108 .05×108 .80×108 .01×108
Qvac 0.0001074 0.00009 0.0001233 0.0001539 0.0002112 0.0001586 0.0001180 0.0001319 0.000396
Evac 0.2016 0.1564 0.2323 0.1485 0.1994 0.1947 0.1575 0.1511 0.1588 
Time 1283 s 1426 s 1103 s 1214 s 1125 s 1213 s 1196 s 1094 s 1212 s 
 
